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Formulation of Government Financial Regulations 
and Incentives for Foreign Private Direct 
Investment: A Methodological Inquiry 
by Thomas B. Trumpy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Government regulation of foreign private direct investment is almost a 
universal fact. I Foreign investment is subject to specific regulation in most 
countries simply because it has a different base country.2 Even the United 
States, formerly a bastion of economic laissez-faire, and the leading base coun-
• Thomas B. Trumpy, a graduate of Princeton (A.B. and Special Program in European 
Civilization) and of Columbia G.D.), has been an International Fellow at Columbia University, 
studied in The Hague on an International Legal Research Fund Fellowship, in Geneva as a Swiss 
Universities Foundation Exchange bourseholder, and pursued courses in international taxation 
at Boston University. He is a member of the New York, Massachusetts and Rhode Island Bars 
and has served as International Attorney and Counsel of NYSE listed corporations before mov-
ing to Paris to pursue a career in international financial management. His interest in Interna-
tional Investment dates from his Chairmanship of a Conference on Trade and Investment in 
Latin America in 1963 and has continued through his professional career during which he has 
written several articles and spoken at seminars, particularly a Conference of the Alumni of the 
Hague Academy ofInternationai Law held in Athens in 1977 at which the ideas developed in this 
article were first exposed. 
1. An investment is an economic activity engaged in for profit by the investor. Foreign direct in-
vestments are investments in assets and non-marketable securities which cannot easily and rapidly 
be made, or liquidated into the investor's base currency, or on a securities market. 
While a local investor regards return on investment only at the site of investment (local profit-
ability), a foreign investor usually regards the ultimate after tax risks and return in his base coun-
try and base currency (net basI cormtry return on investment). 
Elements affecting base country return, such as currency fluctuations, the relation between 
local, third country and base country tax rates, the local deductibility of all investment-related 
expenses, base country tax credits for local income taxes, and exchange controls, may cause a 
foreign investor's appreciation of the attractiveness of an investment to vary substantially from 
the viewpoint of a local investor or an evaluation based solely upon the local return at the site of 
investment in the host country and its currency. 
2. The basis for such a reaction is discussed in Vagts, The Host Country Faces the MultitllJtiotllJl 
Enterprise, 53 B.U.L. REV. 261 (1973). 
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try3 for foreign investment, has managed to convince itself that foreign invest-
ment in the United States should be reported because it is foreign.· 
The study of financial regulation of foreign investment which gave rise to 
this article led to the conclusion that the economics of foreign investment and 
its benefits and inconveniences are little understood by the host countries to 
such investment. 5 In considering how a potential foreign investor should 
3. The term 'base country' has been chosen as in the author's opinion it reflects best the place 
the taxes, exchange controls, accounting rules and currency of which are used to measure 
ultimate return on investment and permissability of business options and strategies. The term 
'homl! country' might be confusing in the case of a true multinational corporation (MNC) and refers 
more to the legal fact of situs of the registered office, a concept hardly applicable to interlocked 
groups, as in Japan, for example. 'Homl! Country' is the term used in the basic study, MULTINA· 
TIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. ST/ECAlI90, at 46 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS]. 
4. It remains unclear whether the United States has examined whether or not as an economic 
question it encourages foreign investment. In 1970 it encouraged foreign investment. The foreign 
investment encouragement program was organized within the Bureau of International Com-
merce of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Reverse investment offices were also set up in 
several overseas locations. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INVEST IN THE USA (1973). The Euro-
pean promotion and representation program was launched in 1967. U. S. Seeles to Promote European 
Investment in American Factories, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1967, at 1, col. 5. The program was discon-
tinued when funding was not renewed after 1976. The U.S. government presently favors but 
does not promote foreign investment according to U.S. Embassy sources in Paris. Conversations 
with representatives of the Commercial and Economic Affairs Office in Paris, France (June 
1979). 
A recent expression of U.S. policy was issued by the Hon. C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations: U. S. Policy Toward 
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: The Role of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States, July 30, 1979, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) (copy available in the Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review offices). In outlining the policy reasons for the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) which was set up in 1975, Assistant Secretary Bergsten 
referred to a formal review of U.S. policy of inward and outward investment: 
1d. 
The review was carried out by the Economic Policy Group, the Administration's top 
policy-making body for all economic issues. It resulted in a statement, issued in July 
1977, confirming the long-standing U.S. commitment to an open international 
economic system. The statement concluded that: 
The fundamental policy of the U.S. Government toward international invest-
ment is to neither promote nor discourage inward or outward flows or ac-
tivities. 
The Government therefore should normally avoid measures which would give 
special incentives or disincentives to investment flows or activities and should 
not normally intervene in the activities of individual companies regarding in-
ternational investment. Whenever such measures are under consideration, 
the burden of proof is on those advocating intervention to demonstrate that it 
would be beneficial to the national interest. 
5. For an analysis of the motivations and conditions for foreign investment, see G. REUBER, 
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT (1973)Jhereinafter cited as REUBER]. See also 
Barnes, Foreign Investment in Canada and Mexico: An Agendafor Host Country Screening, 1 B. C. INT'L & 
COMPo L. J. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Barnes]. For the effect of such regulation on the private 
investor, and the private investor's analysis of regulation, see Trumpy, The Analysis of Financial 
Regulations and Incentives Governing Private Foreign Investment, ANNUAIRE DE t' A.A.A. DE DROIT IN-
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analyze the effect of such regulation on its actIvItIes, and how a potential 
foreign investor should prepare to negotiate any special regulatory regime re-
quired by its business, certain matrices were prepared. 6 The difficulty in 
preparing such matrices for the analysis of non-fiscal financial regulation is 
TERNATIONALE DE LA HAVE (to be published in 1980) [hereinafter cited as Trumpy) (draft copy 
available in the Boston College Intmrational and Comparative lAw Review offices). The following text is 
drawn from this article: 
What should be the response of the foreign direct investor? Should all regulation be 
considered as a "cost of doing business," paid for and forgotten? It is submitted that 
this approach, frequently encountered as a response to taxes, may be inappropriate in 
the case of certain types of financial regulation, specifically those regulations which may 
restrict the planned activity of the economic units to be created, or render it impractical 
or illegal. 
The investor's response to such regulation must be logically prepared, even if the 
regulations do not appear to be coherent. The investor can prepare his plan based upon 
his base country rules and those of the site of his investment. Alternatively, the investor 
can seek the regimes, fiscal and otherwise, which will give the greatest protection 
against the incidences ofthose host country regulations which are the least acceptable to 
his business needs. Examples of such 'antidotes' to host country regulation are: 
1. Base country tax credits for host country taxes, 
2. Base country incentives for investments abroad, and 
3. Base country allowance (non-integration in the investor's base country income) of 
the tax or other incentives granted by the host country. 
Each investor, or group of investors, may therefore bring to a host country a different 
set of parameters which, when integrated with the host country regulations, will permit 
the investor to determine whether an investment will be attractive. Since an investor 
can usually seek intermediate bases for investment, the host country must assume that 
investors will seek the most advantageous combination of base country and host country 
regimes. 
Thus, the regulation shopping investor has created an even more complicated 
analytical problem. This arises because the exact language used in the financial regula-
tions of foreign investment rarely coincides from one country to another (or even one 
regulated area to another) and minor variances in text may particularly affect some 
potential investors. 
/d. at 2-3. 
The investor will regard the openness, fairness and finality of administrative decision in choos-
ing whether to invest. In particular the investor will consider procedures for exemptions, 
qualifications for waivers, possibilities of 'grandfather clauses' in regulations, and legal and ad-
ministrative means of avoiding, delaying and opposing enforcement. 
Foreign investors may structure their operations multilaterally, dividing their operations be-
tween their base country and one or more intermediary countries to minimize the effect of regula-
tion. This is the form that American acquisitions in the European Community have followed. Ac-
quisitions have often been made via a subsidiary already established inside such zone and entitled 
to freely establish itself in any other member countries regardless of ultimate ownership. See 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 58, 298 
~.N.T.S. 11 (1958). 
The right of EFC country companies to claim freedom of establishment rights under Article 58 
regardless of ultimate ownership or control by non-EEC persons (e.g., a U.S. company) has now 
been acquiesced in by all the EEC countries. 
6. These matrices are appended to this article in full. Portions of the individual matrices have 
been selectively reprinted as Tables 1-6 which appear at relevant sections of the article for the 
reader's convenience. 
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provoked by the absence of the systematic and schematic approach found in 
the fiscal regulations of foreign investment in most countries. 7 
This article suggests how a host country may organize financial regulation 
of foreign private direct investment based upon a series of matrices. These 
matrices make the total set of regulatory options more available for economic 
analysis and policy making than does the review of existing regulatory texts 
which include only certain rules. The aim of such analysis is to permit host 
countries to avoid regulations which may be counterproductive to their 
development effort, as when regulations stifle the enterprise they encourage, 
or grant incentives of greater cost to the host country than of net benefit to the 
investor. s 
After setting out the policy considerations and the economic and political 
purposes that result in the adoption of financial regulations, incentives and 
policies, this article examines the scope and methods of the regulation of 
foreign direct investment. First, this article analyzes the economic conse-
quences of regulation for the host country and provides case analyses of some 
sample areas of regulations and incentives. 
It is the author's conclusion that when host countries are considering in-
stituting a regiJlatory framework for foreign direct investment they must first 
formulate the economic and policy goals that the regulatory framework is de-
signed to achieve. Second, they should selectively examine .the total range of 
regulatory options available as well as the effects of those options, as is illus-
trated by examples of actual regulations in certain countries when analyzed 
according to the matrices which have been developed. By instituting only 
those regulations which will produce the desired consequences, host countries 
can avoid burdensome or inappropriate regulation that is not necessary to 
achieve the particular economic and political goals and that can have the effect 
of discouraging foreign direct investment. Only through the selective imposi-
tion of foreign investment regulations can host countries further policy goals 
without discouraging foreign direct investment with functionally ill adapted 
regulations. International organizations such as the World Bank9 and the 
7. Tax regulation is generally more well thought out from an economic basis and relatively 
free of glaring inconsistencies and loopholes, even in otherwise not highly developed legal 
systems. Perh.aps this situation is due to borrowing of statutory frameworks from more developed 
nations. Certainly it is due to an almost universal approach to gross income, deductions, 
allowances, disallowances, net income, taxes, and tax credits. 
8. See Barnes, supra note 5, on the need for host country screening but with flexibility of legal 
standards to meet economic goals. 
9. 60 Stat. 1440 (1945), T.I.A.S. No. 1502. The World Bank and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development were established at the International Monetary and Financial 
Conference of the United and Associated Nations held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 
July, 1944. 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)IO should 
pursue the study of the effect of incentives and regulations compared to host 
country policy goals, and in consideration of their effect upon the decision of 
foreign investors to invest. 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Policies and Attitudes 
Financial regulations, incentives and policies generally are adopted to effect 
economic and political goals of the host country.11 These goals include: 12 
1. effective revenue collection (tax policy), 
2. industrial development (economic policy), 
3. trade (monetary policy), and 
4. job creation and upgrading (labor policy). 
10. Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec. 14, 
1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891. 
11. The economic intent of regulation is divided by the World Bank Development Committee 
into three functions: 
1. Lowering input costs (capital, labor, technology, energy) 
2. Protecting (raising) output prices (Tariffs, quotas, bairiers) 
3. Increasing after tax cash flows (grants, subsidies, tax relief). 
WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, SPECIFIC EcONOMIC INCENTIVE POLICIES OF LDC's 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE FLOW AND NET BENEFITS OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT, U.N. 
Doc. DC/WG/CM-78-3, supplement 3 (1978) (working paper; private distribution in the posses-
sion of the author) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE). 
12. One could also define the principal policy considerations of a bo.se country as follows: 
- avoidance of runaway industries to cheaper labor zones 
- protection and expansion of export markets 
- avoidance of capital outflows 
- avoidance of loss of tax base through expansion abroad 
± potential export to and through controlled foreign companies 
± providing growth for major national industries without local monopolization. 
See REUBER, supra note 5. Note the divergence of interest of the base country investor with his 
government on the negative considerations. Although four of the above-cited reasons point 
against foreign investment it is universally recognized that it is essential to provide to national 
businesses the supporting means so that they may trade overseas and finance major overseas 
projects. Consider Russia's Amtorg, Banque COllJmerciaie pour I'Europe du Nord head-
quartered in Paris, the Moscow Narodny Bank in London and shipping and trading offices 
around the world as a recognition of this business reality. Meyer, This Communist Internationale has 
a Capitalist Accent, FORTUNE, Feb. 1977, at 134, 135. For a discussion of the policies and programs 
for private economy developed countries, see OECD DEVELOPMENT AsSISTANCE COMMITTEE 
GROUP, INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (3d rev. ed. 1975). A detailed example of Ger-
man regulation appears in H. GOLTZ, FORDERUNG PRIVATER KAPITALANLAGEN 
(DIREKTINVESTITIONEN IN ENTWICKLUNGSLANDERN) (1975). See Annex 3, Table B, column D. 
For an analysis of the interplay of objectives and policy of host countries, see H. ScHNEIDER, 
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND PROJECT ApPRAISAL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 36 (1975). See also 
Boddewyn, Western European Policies Toward U.S. Investors, 93-95 THE BULL. 51 (1974) [hereinafter 
cited as Boddewyn); S. LALL & A. STREETEN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TRANSNATIONALS AND 
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The types of regulation which may be instituted are affected by the: l ! 
1. policy fallout (some policy goals affect only certain regulatory 
areas); 
2. importance of policy goals in the absolute (normally measured 
by the internal economic impact) and; 
3. relative importance of policy goals (e.g. the need for technology 
versus the cost of buying or creating technology). 
Nevertheless, there exist regulations which are contrary to both local 
economic and political logic for reasons of historical oversight or chauvinistic, 
personal or other attitudes of the host country government. Much, if not all, 
regulation indicates a benign neglect of the necessary interplay of such regula-
tion with existing or proposed tax treaties or with the internal law of the 
primary existing or expected base countries for local investment. 14 Similarly , 
most legislation does not consider the problems of regulating parallel or serial 
investments. 15 Such problems are a subject of bilateral negotiations and are 
beyond the scope of this article. 
If we consider the policy considerations for financial regulations which ap-
ply to foreign investment we note that the interests of the base country and the 
site of investment are frequently opposed. The interests of the foreign in-
.vestor, and of public and private sector institutions and businesses in the site 
of investment may also be adverse and in each case may be contrary to those of 
the base as well as the host state. 16 
Foreign investors which already have investments in the site of investment 
may become the most strident protectionists of their local markets against fur-
ther competitive foreign investment. The following table presents examples of 
the differing attitudes toward some economic considerations for foreign invest-
ment: 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1977) [hereinafter cited as LALL & STREETEN). See also REUBER, supra 
note 5, for an earlier attempt at quantification of these objectives. 
13. Trumpy, supra note 5. 
14. For a discussion of the host country's unawareness of investor's goals and methods, see 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 3, at 46. For an analysis of company decision mak-
ing, see Y. AHARONI, THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
AHARONI). On the desire of the investor to minimize capital at risk in the foreign country of in-
vestment, see id. at 150. 
15. Financial regulations on foreign investment may be imposed by both the host country and 
base country of the investor, or by intermediate countries which are the 'base countries' of in-
termediate companies in a multi-national corporate structure. Relative to an investment, regula-
tions can thus be multilateral in parallel (joint or cooperating investors or different base countries) 
where the laws, regulations and tax treaty relations between the site of investment and such in-
termediate countries come into play, or both in parallel and in series (Residents of A and B set up a 
holding company in C to invest in D) (Resident of A invests in D but licenses to D through C). 
16. For a discussion of investor, base country and host country motives, see P. GRAY, THE 
EcONOMICS OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT ABROAD (1972). Set also PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD (P. Ady ed. 1972). 
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TABLE 1 
Host Country 
Economic Base Country Investor Host Country 
Considerations Attitude Attitude Attitude Others 
low labor cost - threat to base - positive - desire to increase 
country employ- living standard 
ment 
high tariffs - poor export - negative for - desire to pro- - usually hos 
market import of tect inefficient country a1s o 
pol 
d 
means of pro- ·Iocal production seeks to ex 
duction or transforme 
product. Pro- products 
tected market 
once estab-
lished 
use of natural - neutral, unless - positive - fear of exploi-
resources competitor tation of low-cost 
(negative) or internal labor 
user (positive) - desire to develop 
- desire to encour-
age further trans-
formation 
labor intensive - threat to local - positive - - positive 
investment employment subject to labor 
law 
participation - neutral or - positive unless - positive need 
in trade zone positive entrenched for sheltered 
competition export markets 
B. Policy Considerations of the Host Country 
The principal policy considerations of a host country are: l7 
1. the protection of industries essential for national defense or for 
other sectors of the national economy (security of supply); 
2. the protection of traditional local industries from excessive 
competition; 
3. the prevention of capital outflows of profits, royalties and earn-
ings of foreigners, and protection of the currency; 
4. the development of new jobs and new technical industrial 
capacities or upgrading of jobs and the technical base of in-
dustry; 
5. the encouragement of capital inflows; and 
6. the development of its own export industries and the support 
services for international business. 
17. An earlier attempt to quantify both host and base country interests appears in REUBER, 
supra note 5. The standards for qualifying an enterprise for incentives are in many cases related to 
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Of these considerations the first three generally discourage foreign investment 
and the latter three encourage it. 
The policy choices are neither simple nor evident for host or base country 
and local interests may be divided on what measures to take. Each country 
would like to be economically independent and to have a solid currency and 
established international businesses. 
To what extent is foreign investment an acceptable means of providing 
development towards those goals? For many developing countries there is an 
initial allure in the creation of labor intensive industries. Where the effect of 
the failure to modernize and automate a plant is to condemn it to produce 
goods not of exportable quality, sophistication and price, the absence of ex-
pansion of the facility, and the lack of technical upgrading of the local jobs can 
be a more serious disadvantage for the economy of the host country than the 
fewer jobs initially created by a modern industry .18 
Regulations on the importation and remuneration of technologyl9 may be 
taken as examples of good intentions leading to technological impoverishment 
of the economy. The expropriation of rights, as viewed by the investor, will 
give temporary property to the site of investment, but insure that no substan-
tial infusions of new technology will occur subsequently. 
Where exchange controls, designed to prevent outflows of capital from a 
poor country, force a foreign investor to take export sales profits outside the 
host country because of export financing restrictions, 20 one may observe how a 
well intended rule may be counter-productive when applied to foreign based 
companies. 
If the service sector is closed to foreign investment, the state or a closed club 
of local firms tends to develop a slow, inefficient system which is often profit-
able to itself. There is a risk to the whole plan of economic growth with such a 
system. Thus, a developing country should seriously consider the effects of a 
policy of maximum encouragement for joint venutre investment21 by foreign 
firms, but should condition work and investment permits for all foreign 
standards used in screening an enterprise for investment approval. See the list of investment selec-
tion criteria developed in H. Perlmutter & F. Lombard, A Survey of Existing Investment Codes, 
A Report to the United Nations (1975) (unpublished manuscript, Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania). See also H. Robinson, The Motivation aNi the Flow of Private Foreign Investment, 1961 
STANFORD REsEARCH INSTITUTE INVESTMENT SERIES No.4 [hereinafter cited as Robinson]. 
18. See Boddewyn, supra note 12, at 11. 
19. See S V.C infra. 
20. Such as those discussed in S V.D infra. 
21. In the widest sense, the' 'joint venture" comprises any form of association which im-
plies collaboration for more than a very transitory period .... Such partnerships 
show a great variety of patterns. There may be "50-50" partnerships, in which the 
local investor - public or private·- holds one-half of the shares, and the foreign in-
vestor, the other half. There may be equity associations in which one partner holds a 
majority (though often only 51 percent of the shares) and the other partner the 
minority. An existing enterprise may be transformed into a joint venture with the 
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nationals on the training of local personnel in the base and third country 
operations of the investor. Once sufficient local expertise is developed it may 
be appropriate to restrict further foreign investment in certain sectors. 22 
The presence of experienced, international business normally will be to the 
advantage of the site of foreign investment in developing the expertise of the 
local service sector, e.g., banks, freight forwarders, customs brokers, and 
travel agencies. The diffusion of knowledge of the techniques of international 
business to local nationals must not be impaired by letting foreign enterprises 
tied to foreign investors control these sectors. From the point of view of the 
host country, foreign investment ultimately involves additions to its capital 
and technical base, and permits expansion of employment opportunities and 
export earnings. 
Private foreign investment, however, inevitably involves currency export of 
the return on investment and of the value of any imported products, com-
ponents or technology, and may bring a strong, experienced competitor onto 
the local market to the detriment oflocal firms. Thus, local regulations usually 
are ambiguous in their effort to make rules which recognize the fact of ulti-
mate foreign ownership yet seek to control the investment as a wholly local 
enterprise. 23 
The short term gains for a host country from investments made to create 
employment or to exploit foreign technology, or from currency protection 
measures, must therefore be measured on a continuing basis against the 
economic health and growth of the enterprises created and of existing enter-
prises and related business sectors. 24 
III. SCOPE AND METHODS OF REGULATION 
Direct investments generally are long term commitments. Nominally this 
would suggest a fixed regulatory structure permitting maximum predictability 
for investors. However, the demands of policy call for the greatest suppleness 
in rulemaking as to specific investments at particular moments in the develop-
foreign investor retaining a controlling interest, while the minority shares are held by 
the local government or a government-controlled development corporation, a small 
group of local capitalists, or the public. 
W. FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 6 (1961). 
22. Se, S V.A infra and Annex 3, Table A. 
23. Se', '.g., Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Common Regime of 
Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, [Decision 
24), Law of Dec. 31, 1970, (1971) R. O. No. 264, at 1 (Ecuador), translated in 11 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS 126 (1972), as amended, translated in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977). Decision 84 on 
the Basis for a S'lbregional Technological Policy. 1974, GRUPO ANDINO, Sep. No. 28, at I-II 
(June, 1974), translated in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1478 (1974), established the basis for the 
transfer of technology in the region. Decision 85 on Industrial Property, 1974, GRUPO ANDINO, 
Sep. No. 28, at 11-12 (June, 1974), translated in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1489 (1974), approved 
the Regulation for the Application of Rules on Industrial Property. 
24. Boddewyn, supra note 12, at 11. 
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ment cycle to avoid' 'overbuilding" of a sector or the excesses of good intent. 
Regulatory responses of host, base and intermediary country governments 
will be determined in part by constitutional considerations and legislative and 
regulatory policy constraints: what is subject to regulation as a constitutional 
matter, what is within the normal scope of regulation, what has traditionally 
been regulated and, who is to make and manage the regulations. These struc-
tural considerations often are as important as policy considerations in the for-
mulation of regulations. 
Many of the considerations of regulation-making are posed in other areas of 
concern to business such as environmental or employee safety regulations. 
Others have special significance to foreign investment due to the overriding ef-
fect of treaties, trade agreements and special economic factors. 
To the extent that financial regulation of foreign investment is an acknowl-
edged part of a country's body of administrative law and regulation, it will be 
easier for both the host nation and foreign investors to deal with it as a normal 
aspect of doing business rather than as a special, and hence political, domain. 
A. Regulation of Existing Investments 
Foreign investment cannot be regulated once and then forgotten. Regula-
tion must be a continuing process of adjusting local and foreign investors' 
desires to national needs. How to structure the regulatory process becomes a 
consideration in itself, since policy goals cannot be generalized and fixed. 
Much has been written on the economic incentives for investment,25 but little 
literature exists from either the point of view of the host country or the investor 
concerning the effect on both existing investments, and on increases of in-
vestments, of continuing and evolving regulations. 26 
The greatest experience has been that of U.S. and British investors whose 
base country tax laws and habits relating to foreign income are very different. 
While British corporations normally distribute substantial dividends, a weak-
ening currency and the effective lack of taxation of profits held in overseas in-
vestments have encouraged British corporations to reinvest and retain most of 
their overseas profits in overseas holding companies. U.S. corporations have 
traditionally distributed small dividends and reinvested most of their earnings. 
The deferral of U.S. taxation on profits of active investments overseas (ex-
cluding financial or intellectual property holding companies since 1966),27 and 
25. B. BKLASSA, POLICY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1977); Belassa, Export Incentives 
and Export Performance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Anarysis, in WORLD BANK REPRINT -
SERIES No. 59 (1978); FRANK, KIM & WESTPHAL, FOREIGN TRADE REGIMES AND EcONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: SoUTH KOREA (1975); Landau, Direct Foreign Investment in Developing Countries?, 4 
J. L. & EcON. DEV. 182 (1969). . 
26. See AHARONI, supra note 14. On the desire of the investor to minimize capital at risk in the 
foreign country of investment, see id. at 150. See also Robinson, supra note 17. 
27. I.R.C. SS 951-64. 
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the regulations of the Office of Foreign Direct Investments during the period 
1968 to 197528 have not, however, caused U.S. companies to reinvest foreign 
earnings locally (or even overseas) and dividends in amounts approximating 
total earnings have been repatriated. 29 
We must not, therefore, consider the stability offoreign investments solely 
in terms of major start-ups and shutdowns. The experience in Europe since 
1970 has shown that foreign investors will disinvest completely or relatively if 
economic conditions change unfavorably. 30 Such changes have been un-
favorable exchange rates (Germany),51 higher labor costs forced by inflation 
(France),52 escalated wages unrelated to productivity (Belgium)," and labor 
strife (Italy, Britain)." 
Creeping disinvestment is represented by the investor which fails to increase 
activities in proportion to local overall corporate means, market or growth 
rates which allows an enterprise to consume itself through failure to reinvest in 
new technology and capital equipment necessary for the enterprise to remain 
economically viable. 
B. A Suggested Approach to Host Country Regulations 
It is suggested that an analysis of desirable regulation can be facilitated by 
the preparation of matrices showing the logical sequence of the regulatory 
text. 35 When the regulatory framework is analyzed as to its subject matter 
(what is regulated and what is not), universality (chronologically, by industry, 
and in territory) and administrative methods (rulings, exemptions, etc.), the 
analysis aids the host country in determining what it has created. In addition, 
such an analysis permits the investor to avoid pitfalls and plan creatively, 
using base cOlJntry and third country investment incentives where available. 36 
Table 237 is illustrative of the types of financial regulations of foreign invest-
ment, some of which are analyzed in the matrices presented in this article. 
28. See 31 C.F.R. H 500, 520 (1978). 
29. See MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 3, at Tables 10,20 & 37 which for the late 
1960's show a return on foreign investments of about 10 percent for both the United States and 
Britain, but which show repatriated profits at base country level of about 75 percent of earnings 
for Britain but of slightly over 100 percent for the United States. 
30. See Trend of Foreign Direct Investments in Belgium, 1978 REPORT FROM BRUSSELS No. 54, at 3 
(Banque Bruxelles Lambert ed.) [hereinafter cited as REPORT FROM BRUSSELS); Wall St. J., Feb. 
14, 1978, at 7, col. 1. 
31. See REPORT FROM BRUSSELS, supra note 30; Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1978, at 2, col. 4. 
32. See REPORT FROM BRUSSELS, supra note 30. 
33. Id.; Wall St. J., June 30, 1978, at 10, col. 4. 
34. REPORT FrOM BRUSSELS, supra note 30. 
35. See Trumpy, supra note 5. 
36. See, e.g., the incentives accorded by the French government for the creation by French 
enterprises of foreign commercial subsidiaries and lesser benefits for creation of foreign manufac-
turing subsidiaries. Loi des Finances Rectificative 1972 of27 December 1972, Arts. 6(1),6(2), in-
corporated in CODE GENERAL DES 1M POTS Art. 39. 
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TABLE 2 
Financial Regulations of Foreign Investment 
1) Regulation of Investment (Sector, location and capital) 
A. Protected sectors and limits on foreign ownership 
B. Preliminary permissions and investment incentives 
C. The right to expand (linear, diversifying, integrating growth) 
D. Minimum capital structure and equilibrium 
E. Repatriation .controls and guarantees 
2) Regulation of Fi1llJ1ICing OperaJions 
A. Use of external loans and guarantees 
B. Borrowing on local and foreign markets 
C. Intercompany loans and interest 
D. Split exchange rates and investment discounts and premiums 
3) Regulation of CU"t1ICy Transtu:tions 
A. Sending checks, instruments of payment and securities abroad 
B. Making transfers abroad 
C. The right to have foreign bank accounts 
D. Availability of foreign exchange; set off and paired import and export transactions 
E. Covering forward transactions and capital erosion 
F. Putting up tender bonds domestically.or abroad 
G. Insuring risks and benefits abroad 
4) Regulation of Operations and Trade 
A. Importation of patents, trademarks, knowhow and payment of royalties 
B. Payment of commissions to foreign agents (affIliates or others) 
C. Management and service fees 
D. Parent company guarantees to third parties to aid operations 
E. Intercompany supply and marketing contracts 
F. Deposits and taxes on payments abroad or imports 
G. Customs and regulations of imports of goods and equipment 
5) Regulation of Profits and Distributions 
A. Reserves and dividends - Limited tate of return 
B. Withholding taxes on dividends, interest and royalties paid abroad 
C. Loans abroad to related parties 
D. Treaty implications and tax sparing 
6) Regulation of Personnel 
A. Payment of hard currency salaries and insured or other benefits 
B. Living allowances and advantages 
C. Repatriation of funds of foreign personnel (during and at end of stay) 
D. Currency allowances for foreign business travel; time exigencies 
E. Exemption of foreign nationals from local rules prohibiting foreign financial accounts and 
investments 
F. Role of foreign managers and technicians 
7) Taxes 
A. Income 
B. Turnover 
C. Social taxes and transferability of benefits 
D. Capital 
E. Excise and transfer of assets 
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IV. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATION 
Weare examining a domain in which law is modifying the natural 
economic parameters of an activity. The economic decision whether or not to 
invest or reinvest is based upon numerous factors. A site of investment may 
lose an economic activity entirely to another site of investment if the total ef-
fect created, consciously or unconsciously, through policies, rules and treaties 
is relatively unfavorable for a particular investor. The interaction of base country 
and host country rules may produce different results in the case of each in-
vestor and investment. 
The following analysis of the nature and effect of financial regulations is 
based upon the author's observations as an inside or outside advisor to in-
dustrial groups faced on a regular and continuing basis with questions con-
cerning investment, reinvestment, risks, guarantees and methods of implanta-
tion. 58 
The decisions taken in the cases observed were (in approximate order) the 
result of considerations of business economics, availability of financing, 
growth opportunities, political risks, and financial and administrative 
burdens. 39 In no case did a decision on an initial investment turn on a one or 
two percent difference in taxes or interest charges. The economic gain was 
usually designed sufficiently generous to accommodate some modification in 
tax and interest rates. In the case ofV.S. investors before 1970, exchange rate 
risks were rarely considered. Because of changes in V.S. accounting rules, 
they may now be given a disproportionate importance. +0 
37. Table 2 is Annex 2. It-is an attempt at an exhaustive list of types of financial regulation. 
All regulation of whatever type usually has an economic effect of costing or saving money to an 
enterprise and its investors. We are here concerned only with those regulations, the immediate 
point of application of which is financial in the host country for the investment. This article does 
not attempt to catalog the consequences of all such types of financial regulation. It is hoped that 
the examples in Section V infra will suffice for discussion of certain of the most obvious conse-
quences of such regulations, leaving for others the task of quantifying their effect in particular 
cases on both the host country economy and the regulated enterprise. 
The Summary of types of positive and negative regulations made by the World Bank Develop-
ment Committee includes the following: 
a. Regulation (and exemption) of business activity 
b. Foreign exchange Restrictions and Incentives 
c. Guarantees 
d. Credii Incentives and Restrictions 
e. Tax Incentives and Disincentives 
f. Cash Grants and Subsidies 
g. Grants and Subsidies in Kind 
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, supra note 11. 
38. See note 26 supra. 
39. Robinson, supra note 17. 
40. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Accountingfor the Translation of Foreign Currency 
Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial Statements, 1975 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS No.8; Comment, Foreign Currency Translation Mtlhodologp and Its Impact on Multina-
tional Financial Reporting, 1 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 149 (1977). 
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'The decision process, particularly in capital equipment or inventory inten-
sive industries, was always a continuing one. After the initial investment pro-
vided the means to judge the economic attractiveness more accurately, deci-
sions to continue the development of business in one country or another were 
frequently based upon very small margins of difference. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a person outside a corporation to follow 
the bases of discussion and the decisional process within an investing corpora-
tion regarding the evolution planned for each of its investments. The results of 
a change of host or base country economic policy, business climate or regula-
tions occasionally are observed during negotiations with host country 
authorities. Unless such policy changes are of initial importance to a planned 
investment or of catastrophic magnitude to existing investments or their pro-
duction, no immediate reaction to such changes is observable. The investor 
simply cites "other business reasons" and does not pursue the investment.u 
Scholarly journals discussing legal remedies in cases of creeping expropri-
ation rarely discuss the economic loss to the host country resulting from jobs 
and economic activity not created from the moment the host country economic 
climate' sours.' It is suggested that investments which do not occur because of 
the absence of an atmosphere of confidence and stability are the keystone for a 
bridge between the rich and the developing nations which seek investment or 
its economic benefits. 
Financial regulations therefore have great relevance to base and host coun-
tries as well as to investors. In choosing the regulatory means to effect 
economic and political goals, a base or host country must take into account the 
effect of such regulatory means on foreign investors both as representatives of 
specific base countries and as a class. What may affect one investor or in-
vestors of one base country may not affect others in the same way. 
For every means of financial regulation there are also strategies which will 
be adopted by the investor to preserve or improve his position. The possible 
pairings of government regulations and investor strategies to achieve max-
imum benefits are innumerable. They may include serial or multilateral struc-
turing of the investor's position to qualify for the best conditions. 
The following matrices, presented in full in Table 3,.2 do not attempt to 
cover all areas of regulation, but seek to present examples for further study of 
the methods of foreign investment regulations and their intended and 
unintended economic consequences. 
The mat~ices are based upon the author's review of the financial regulations 
of a number of countries. Attention in preparing an analysis of a particular 
area has been directed to regulations which are: 
41. See the discussion of incidence of aid on the choice of country of implantation in Les Aides 
a l'Expansion Industriel Regionale dans les Pays du Marche Commun, La Documentation Fran-
c;aise No. 3,917, at 15 (11 Septembre 1972) [hereinafter cited as La Documentation Franc;aise). 
42. Table 3 is Annex 3, Table A. 
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1. Particularly detailed, for example the French capital exchange 
controls, which are almost unique in the detail of the texts as 
well as in the absence of an overall economic scheme.43 
2. Economically particularly well conceived such as the invest-
ment incentives for export transforming industries (South 
Korea, Taiwan, Greece, Ireland)." 
3. Attempts to codify policy on national economic independence, 
particularly from multinational enterprises, such as the Andean 
Pact and Spanish regulations on the remuneration of imported 
industrial property rights.45 
A. Financing Investments and Operations - Capital Controls 
43 
Capitalization and financing of foreign investment in a host country is an 
area of regulation specifically directed towards the role of foreign investors in 
the economy. Such regulations are common particularly when it is expected 
that the foreign investor considers a site of investment to pose substantial risks 
of erosion or loss of its investment. 
When a foreign investor considers a site of investment to pose risks of 
erosion or of loss of investment, many countries are reluctant to risk their own 
limited financing ability and, therefore, require investors: 
1. to bring new money into the country, 46 
2. to limit the extent to which local financing may be obtained at 
all, 0.r47 
43. The absence of an economically conceived scheme was personally confirmed by the ad-
ministration to the author in 1977. 
44. For a discussion of export incentives and import substitution and, in particular, their pur-
pose, effect and dislocations, see REUBER, supra note 5; see also note 25 supra. For examples of in-
centives for export in Greece, Cyprus, Taiwan and South Korea, see Greece in 3 INVESTMENT 
LAWS OF THE WORLD (ICSID ed. 1977); BANQUE HELLENIQUE POUR LE DtVELOPPEMENT IN· 
DUSTRIEL, S.A., INVESTISSEMENTS EN GRECE: No.2, TAUX D'AMORTISSEMENT (1977); BANQUE 
HELLENIQUE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL, S.A., INVESTISSEMENTS EN GRECE: No.4, 
INCITATIONS AU DEVELOPPEMENT REGIONAL (1977); BANQUE HELLENIQUE POUR LE DEVELOPPE· 
MENT INDUSTRIEL, S.A., INVESTISSEMENTS EN GRECE: No.6, INCITATIONS A L'ExPORTATION 
(1977); Ministere de Finance, Direction de I'Information et des Relations Internationales: Impot 
sur Revenu des Personnes Morales (August 1977) (unpublished bulletin); Ministere de Finance, 
Direction de I'Information et des Relations Internationalcs: Incentives to Regional Develop-
ment, No.4 (August 1977) (unpublished bulletin); Ministere de Finance, Direction de !'Informa-
tion et des Relations Internationales: Finanl;ement Bancaire, No.5 (August 1977) (unpublished 
bulletin). CYPRUS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, TAX INCENTIVES IN CYPRUS (1977) (referring to the 
Income Tax Laws No. 37 of 1975 and No. 15 of 1977); Chrysostimides, The Legal Aspects of Foreign 
Investments in Cyprus, ANNUAIRE DE L'AAA DE L'AcADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE DE LA 
HAYE (to be published in 1980). As to the Far East, see general[y Li, Taiwan (Republic of China), 
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DoING BUSINESS IN THE FAR EAST 171 (R. Allison ed. 1972); Kim, 
South Korea (Republic of Korea), CURRENT LEGAL AsPECTS OF DoING BUSINESS IN THE FAR EAST 
194 (R. Allison ed. 1972). 
45. See notes 65 & 66 supra. 
46. See Annex 3, Table A: aI, 2 or 3; bl-l0 or 0; Cl, 3 or 5; and dl or 2. 
47. See Annex 3, Table A: a3; bO; c2 or 4; and d3. 
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3. to limit the local financing obtained against the strength of the 
parent company or group.·8 
The regulations in Table 3 help to control the flow of foreign exchange into 
a country. This prevents a foreign investor from using foreign economic 
power, untaxed locally, to support local operations to the disadvantage of 
other local enterprises, or to export to foreign markets using financing ar-
ranged offshore. Regulations which require a 'normal' local balance sheet 
guarantee sufficient foreign investment so that the investor will not walk away 
in case of political or economic reversals, leaving a company with no local 
assets to pay local creditors and the claims of employees. 
The appropriateness of such regulation may be questioned since financing 
an investment through local debt will permit the foreign investor to shield 
himself from inflation-caused erosion of the investment and will absorb rather 
than increase the monetary base, and, consequently reduce the local risk of 
monetary inflation. 
TABLE 3 
Financing Investments and Operations - Capital Controls(iii) 
a b c 
(i) shall be supplied by from sources 
1. The initial invest- 1. Authorized In- 1. Outside the host 
ment ment capital (iii) country 
2. Total long term 2. Long term private 2. Within the host 
capital needs financing country 
3. Total capital and 3. Long term bank 3. In the base coun-
operating needs financing try 
4. Financing ac- 4. Short term loans 4. In host country 
ccorded to sup- from (non bank) (internal) cur-
pliers sources rency 
5. Financing ac- 5. Short term bank 5: In non-host coun-
corded to financing try (external) 
customers currency 
6. Financing for any 6. Loans and facil- O. Anywhere (no 
purpose from or ities granted regulations) 
to related persons against guar-
antees provided 
by a first class 
host country 
bank 
7. Import financing 7. Loans and facil-
ities granted 
against guar-
antees pro-
vided by a first 
class foreign bank 
or other institu-
tion (strawmen) 
48. See Annex 3, Table A: a3; b7, 8 or 9; c2 or 4; and d3. 
d 
to the extent of 
1.100% 
Z. At least x% (ii) 
3. Not over 7% (ii) 
4.0% 
O. No provision 
(Any, some or all) 
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TABLE 3 - Continued 
Financing Investments and Operations - Capital Controls(iii) 
a 
(i) 
8. Export financing 
General Notes to Matrices 
b 
shall be su pplied by 
8. Loans of related 
parties 
9. Guarantees of re-
lated parties 
10. Swap trans-
actions with for-
eign deposits 
11. (For export 
credit incen-
tives see An-
nex 3, Table B) 
12. (For tax incen-
tives see Annex 
3, Table B(c)) 
13. (For reinvested 
earnings see An-
nex 3, Table 
B(c)) 
O. Any means 
d 
from sources to the extent of 
45 
(i) Choices on the matrix are expressed as the sum of the elements selected across the matrix. 
Thus in A: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 expresses the initial investment shall be supplied by Authorized 
Investment capital from sources outside the host country to the extent of 100% or 
regulatory language to that effect. 
(ii) x and y singly or together may equal under 100%. 
Notes to Example A 
(iii) The nature of investment approvals, limits, or guarantees on repatriation of capital and 
profits, and protection guarantees against capital erosion constitute other matrices not 
presented here. See Boddewyn, supra note 12, at 19. The grounds for such approval are 
generally those governing the availability of incentives. See Example B column d, and Ex-
ample D column e item 4. As to base country regulations and incentives see OECD, IN· 
VESTING IN DEVEWPING COUNTRIES (3d rev. ed. 1975). 
As noted above!9 few local investments have paid substantial dividends 
where investors prefer to reinvest in expansion. For that reason there has been 
little need, and no known attempt to date, to legislate a higher rate or amount 
of reincorporation of earning and reserves in the case of corporations with for-
eign shareholders. The withholding of taxes on dividends (as modified by 
treaty provisions)50 protects the site of the investment's short term interest in 
49. See note 29 supra. 
50. See OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON 
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 19-192 (1977). See also Surrey, United Nations Group of Experts and the 
Guidelinesfor Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,36 
(1978). 
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taxing the economic activity represented by the dividendable profit, but does 
not protect the local interest in maintaining a more solidly financed employer. 
B. Investment Incentives 
Certain regulations on foreign investment provide economic (fiscal, finan-
cial, etc.) advantages for so-called "Industrial Development" investments. 
These advantages may be applied to investments in a country uniformly as to 
place, time and origin, or may be directed specifically to certain regions of a 
country or offered at differing rates in the case of different types of investment, 
number of jobs or level of jobs created and the region of implantation. 51 Par-
ticularly in states where there is little or no internal capital, such incentives 
may be considered related to the desire to attract foreign capital. 52 Table 4 sets 
out a matrix of the relationship of choices of types of incentives for differing 
types of enterprises and their potential effects. 53 
These incentives are frequently of greater interest to the developing host 
country than to the foreign investor,54 since they permit the host government 
to attract capital, knowhow and managers and to provide manpower training. 
The site of investment expects to realize a benefit in the jobs created and the 
multiplier effect on the tax base. 
Investment incentives raise two basic questions: 
a: Do such incentives discriminate against existing enterprises 
in permitting new enterprises to function at better profitability or 
lower cost or with lower exchange exposure risk?55 
b: What is the real benefit of such incentives to the foreign in-
vestor at the base country level after base country taxes?56 
While the first raises troubling questions of standing to challenge acts of one's 
own state, the second is most interesting because of the complex multinational 
financial and tax considerations it raises. 
If one examines the usual goals and means of investment incentives, the 
unintended consequences become clear. If a tax holiday merely shifts tax 
payments into the hands of the base country or a third state; if low interest 
51. On the timing of availability of incentives and the policy considerations and conditions for 
their grant, see Boddewyn, supra note.12, at 27. For an analysis of the objectives of regulations 
(foreign inputs, location, sector, technology, ownership, financial flows, etc.) and of the means 
(foreign exchange, restrictions on investment, guarantees, credits, tax relief, subsidies), see R. 
ROBINSON, A CATALOG OF INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES OFFERED BY 32 NATIONAL AND SUBNA· 
TIONAL GOVERNMENTS (1977). 
52. See note 17 supra. 
53. Table 4 is drawn from Annex 3, Table B. See note 16 supra. 
54. Incentives of a value of 20% of the initial investment are estimated to have only a 2 to 3 
percent incidence on costs. See La Documentation Francaise, supra note 41, at 15. 
55. See, e.g., Law 4171/1961 Concerning General Measures to Promote the Development of 
the Country's Economy, translated in Greece, in 3 INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD 40:20-1.3 
(ICSID ed. 1977), which requires publication of the terms of a grant of incentives for major in-
vestments seeking the benefits of this law. 
56. See, e.g., the incentives accorded by the French government for the creation by French 
enterprises of foreign commercial subsidiaries, supra note 36. 
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rates give rise to untaxed financial profits which permit the foreign investment 
to underprice local competitors, or if other advantages permit the foreign in-
vestor to take his export profits overseas through an untaxed sales company, 
the incentive may represent not only an advantage to the investor, but a 
dislocation of income and control of market share to another state. This is a 
matter which must be considered in view of the tax laws of major investment 
base countries and the systems of bilateral tax treaties which exist between the 
host country and potential base countries. 57 Given the options of multinational 
structures, tax reporting periods, accruals and deferrals, the neutralizing 
possibilities may exceed estimation by a host country and certainly exceed the 
scope of this article. 58 
A local tax incentive or holiday for foreign investment thus may only permit 
the base country instead of the host country to tax the resulting profit with no 
benefit for the investor. Alternatively, it may encourage the investor also to 
keep investing in relatively stable high tax countries because of the "taxes 
paid" credit offset available from his tax holiday investment. 59 For this reason 
such incentives should be discretionary and should be discussed on a case by 
case basis with the foreign investor. Unfortunately this procedure is infre-
quent. 
The direct benefit to an investor of a tax holiday is therefore very limited 
unless the resulting profits can be transferred abroad without a tax upon 
receipt in the transferee (base) state. The indirect incentives available to the 
investor through base country tax laws and treaties may be significant, but not 
directed to the goals ofthe state giving up the tax base through the incentive.60 
57. Set DECISION OF TIlE OECD COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND 
DISINCENTIVES RELATING TO INVESTMENT DISLOCATION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 23 (1976); Sit also U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 
GUIDEUNES FOR TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESAl14, at 12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES]; Bryan, Developed Natiort Tax Law artd 
IrtvestmmJ in LDC's, 17 COLUM.]. TRANSNAT'L L.221 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bryan]. 
58. For the initiation of a study of tax incentives (and disincentives) by developing (and 
developed) countries, and for the proposal of subsidized infrastructure and plant leasebacks by 
host countries as a solution to tax incentives neutralization by base country tax laws, see TAX 
TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESAl42, at 56 
(6th Report 1976); Sit also TAX TREATIES BElWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
U.N. Doc. ST/ESAlI8, at 135 (5th Report 1975). 
59. Sit GUIDEUNES, supra note 57; Bryan, supra note 57; Sit also TAX TREATIES BElWEEN 
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ECAlI88, at 163 (3d Report 1973). 
For a discussion of tax policy and development, and in particular the problems of 'tax sparing' by 
base countries of host country incentives, see Geiger, SIeum"«ht urtd Erttwicklungpolitik, 15 
DEUTSCHES STEUERRECHT 423 (1977), and works cited therein. 
The permissible limits of 'deferral' (5-10-20-50- years) as a means of avoiding foreign recap-
ture of incentive-generated 'profits' would require a separate study. Such indefinite deferral can 
be designed as the discounted tax flow equivalent of a grant. To do this it must be acceptable as a 
true tax liability in the period originally incurred for base country accrual tax accounting but 
must not burden the balance sheet in the host country for shorter .term financing. Leibman,. A 
Formulofor Tax Sparing Credits in U.S. Tax Treaties with Developing Countms, 72 AM.]. INT'L L. 296 
(1978). 
60. TAXATION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY: FEDERAL REPUBUC 
OF GERMANY (U.N. Sales No. E.72.XVI.3); TAXATION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN 
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a 
With respect to a 
1. new 
2. additional 
3. new, addition-
al or existing 
(modernizing 
or transform-
ing) 
b 
Enterprise or 
investment by 
1. anyone 
2. foreign in-
vestors 
3. local investors 
under foreign 
ultimate con-
trol 
4. local investors 
5. local investors 
not having 
their principal 
place of busi-
ness in a des-
ignated terri-
tory 
TABLE 4-
Investment Incentives 
The incentive(s) of 
Taxes (ii) (see 10 below) 
1. Exemption or reduction of income tax (federal and 
local): special exemption of export earnings for x 
years (exemption of incentive payments) 
2. Exemption from property taxes and local tax 
3. Exemption from excise taxes, business licenses, 
stamp, transfer, capital contributions taxes 
4. Exemption from turnover or use and sales taxes 
5. Exemption from x years of social charges on 
( a II / I 0 c a I / tee h n i c a 1/ m an u a 1/ 0 I d / 
young) workers 
6. Exemption from inventory tax 
7. Exemption from customs duties and import restric-
tions or depletion allowances of over 100% 
8. Accelerated amortization of capital equipment, or 
depletion allowances of over 100% 
9. Tax credits for purchases !tnd construction of assets 
Investment (ii) (see 25 below) 
10. Cash grants or financing of construction and equip-
ment of a plant at x% of below normal mortgage 
rates and aid in acquiring plant 
11. Aid for investment studies and business promotion 
12. National investment company (temporary) invest-
ment capital 
13. Free infrastructure and utility connections and 
guaranteed reduced freight and utility rates 
Financing (see 10 above and 24 below) 
14. Guarantees for constructing and equipping plant at 
prime lender loan rate, or on lease purchase 
15. Interest rate rebates, interest free loans or financing 
advantages and interest subsidies 
16. Guarantees for loans for working capital of x % of an-
nual payroll created, y% of needs or z% of turnover 
Personnel (see 5 above) 
17. State aid in recruiting personnel and hiring grants, 
and worker relocation allowances and housing 
18. Training at a cost of up to x units of money for every 
job created plus bonuses for technical training 
19. Facilitation in obtaining work permits for foreign na-
tionals for up to x % of the work force of the plant 
20. Temporary tax exemptions of foreign managers 
. Commerce (see I, 7, 15 above) 
21. Aid in acquiring patent and trademark rights 
22. Assistance in bidding in state contracts 
23. Export incentives and credit guarantees 
24. Exchange control advantage 
Research 
25. Grants, interest free loans and incentives for research 
and development 
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Table 4 cont'd. 
d 
For su£h investments which in the designated areas (i) 
1. Creates or upgrades at least in jobs (over a 
minimum) 
a: for every x jobs, 
b: for every y units of wages paid, 
c: for every z units of investment 
2. Guarantees to put over x units of money or 
y % of sales and/or profits into annual reo 
search 
3. Hires handicapped, aged, young, unskilled or 
technically unemployable persons: for every y 
employees and z units of wages 
4. Represents a new industry and manufacture 
of new products 
5. Aids depressed/favored industries or areas 
6. Conserves or develops natural resources and 
provides a sound infrastructure 
7. Promotes exports 
8. Causes the import of significant capital 
9. Improves work conditions 
10. Improves productivity 
11. Creates or preserves viable stable industries 
12. Reduces imports 
1. 
2. 
,3. 
e 
Shall be made 
May be made 
by 
Shall be with-
in the author-
ity to make of 
49 
f 
(Host Country's) 
1. Federal gov-
ernment 
2. Local govern· 
ment 
3. Industrial De· 
velopment au-
thority 
4. International 
or Regional 
Body 
(i) These regulations frequently include provisions limiting the application of all or part of the 
advantages to part of the territory administered. 
(ii) See TAX TREATIES, irifra note 59, at 98, on the economic need for incentives to reinvest earn-
ings, 'and for a general summary of incentives. 
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Generally, the author has found the specific amount of most incentives to be 
secondary considerations to investors, compared to a favorable business 
climate in the site of investment. 
C. Importation and Remuneration of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights 
It appears that every country wishes to develop the technological level of its 
enterprises, to encourage basic and applied research and to aid in the technical 
improvement of the skills of its nationals. Table 561 catalogues present regula-
tion in this area and other methods of regulation which may encourage the dif-
fusion of technology, if one assumes that this is an appropriate and effective 
area for such regulation. 
Unfortunately, this has proved to be the hardest area for legislation and ad-
ministrative regulation, since the value, utility and useful lives of licenses and 
knowhow are difficult to control, and are subject to the decisions of the base 
country enterprise's management. 
This area of regulation is an excellent example of the effects of continuing 
regulations on the ultimate success and growth or disappearance of the enter-
prise. Certain countries (Mexico,62 Argentina,63 Brazil,64 the Andean Pact,65 
DEVEWPING COUNTRIES BY: UNITED STATES (U.N. Sales No.E.70.XVI.2); TAXATION OF 
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DEVEWPING COUNTRIES BY: UNITED KINGDOM (U.N. Sales 
No:E.72.XVI.2); TAXATION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DEVEWPING COUNTRIES 
BY: FRANCE (U.N. Sales No.E.71.XVI.3). See Anthoine, TfJX Systems of Major Capital Exporting 
Countms: An Examination of Incmtives for Private InvtstmnU at Homt and in Dtoeloping Countries, 32 TAX 
L. REV. 323 (1977). 
61. Table 5 is Annex 3, Table C. 
62. Registro de la Transferencia de Tecnologia [Mexican Law on the Registration of the 
Transfer of Technology and the Use of the Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks], Law of 
Dec. 28, 1972, (1972) D.O., Dec. 30, 1972 (Mex.), translated in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 421 
[1973). See also Mexican Law on Inventions and Trademarks, Law of February 8, 1976, [1976) 
D.O., February 10, 1976 (Mex.). See Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, Mexico's New Transfer of 
Technology and Foreign Investmmt Laws - To What Extmt Havt the Rules Changed?, 10 INT'L LAW 231 
(1976); Whipple, Business View of Mexico Laws, 1978 LES NOUVELLES 155 (Sept. 1978); Torres, 
Another View of New Mexican Laws, 1975 LES NOUVELLES 238 (Dec. 1975); Aguillar, Two Years with 
Mexican Law, 1975 LES NOUVELLES 135 (Sept. 1975). 
63. The 1974 Argentine Law on Transfer of Technology, Law of Sept. 27, 1974, [1974) A 
Anuario No. 20.794 (Arg.), reprinted in 14 INDUS. PROP. 338 (1975); Law No. 21617, Law of 
August 12,1977 (Arg.), which has been passed requiring the registration of technology transfer 
contracts, was implemented by Decree No. 1885 of August 15, 1977, repn·nted in 60 BOLETIN DE 
INFORMACION LEGAL 10-11 (1978). 
64. Law No. 5,772 (Industrial Property Code of 1971), Law of Dec. 21, 1971, (1971) 7 Col-
et;ao 190 (Braz.), has been augmented by Acto Normativo (Normative Act), No. 15, Law of Sept. 
11, 1975, [1975) Revita da Propriedade Industrial No. 256 (Sept. 16, 1975). See Nattier, Limita· 
tions on Marketing Foreign Technology in Brazil, 11 INT'L LAW 437 (1977); Regan, Technology Exchange 
in Brazil, 1976 LES NOUVEllES 219 (Dec. 1976); Address by Ubirajara Quaranta Cabral, Protec-
tion des Inventions et Reglementation des Transfers de Technologie au Bresil, (mimeograph 
transcript of a speech delivered on April 20, 1978 before LES - Licencos et Savior Faire -
France) (copy available from the author). 
65. See note 23 supra. See also Kantor, Restrictions in Latin America, 1977 LES NOUVELLES 227 
(Sept. 1977); St. Landau, World Practice Notes, 1977 LES NOUVEllES 313 (Dec. 1977). 
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TABLE 5 
Importation and Remuneration of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights (i), (ii) 
a 
1. All patents sold 
2. All patents li-
censed 
3. All trademarks & 
copyrights granted 
4. All knowhow 
transferred 
5. All knowhow not 
available locally 
transferred 
6. All intellectual 
property rights 
sold or licensed 
b 
To a host country en-
terprise by 
1. A foreign entity 
2. An entity under 
foreign control 
. 
3. Any transferor re-
lated to the trans-
feree 
4. Any transferor 
, 
Shall be transferred 
for a price which 
shall not exceed 
x% of 
1. The value of the 
goods produced 
thereby 
2. The total turnover 
of the enterprise 
3. The value as de-
preciated of the 
capital equipment 
operating with re-
spect thereto 
4. The total related 
salaries of the en-
terprise 
5. The lowest rate or 
price charged to 
any unrelated user 
6. Their reasonable 
value (minimum 
amount) 
d 
Increased/de-
creased propor-
tionally to the 
percentage of 
1. Foreign sales as a 
percentage of 
turnover 
2. Increase of turn-
over attributable 
thereto 
3. Increase of em-
ployment attribu-
table thereto 
4. (The percentage of 
ownership or con-
trol of the trans-
feree held directly 
or indirectly by 
the transferor) 
5. Research invest-
ment made in the 
country 
6. (Components pur-
chased from, or 
taxes paid for and 
fees paid to the li-
censor) 
7. (Product which 
must be sold back 
to the licensor) 
O. No provision 
(i) The provisions for authorization of such remuneration would present a separate matrix. 
(ii) See TAX TREATIES, supra note 59, at 45, on gross or net taxation and withholding rates as an 
additional means of limiting the return to the licensor. 
Spain66) have attempted to legislate technological development by restricting 
payment for technology. 67 The result has been to discourage the introduction 
of current highly developed technologies rather than to encourage the creation 
of industries based on technology ·existing in the country. 
66. For background information, see Poubo, New Ruling 011 TrallSfer ill Spaill, 1975 LES 
NOUVELLES 70 Gune 1975); Address by Antonio Garriguer Walker, Japanese Investment in 
Spain, Institute of Business Administration and Management - IBAM, Tokyo, Japan Gan. 
1972) (copy available from the author). 
67. See, e.g., Annex 3, Table C: a(15); b(13); c(1 or 2), and d(4 or 0). 
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The control of payments for knowhow is one of the most subjective and dif-
ficult areas to regulate since many valid patents exist for products which are of 
li~tle or no economic benefit to the host country, i.e., toys, disposable replace-
ments for existing traditional products and import-dependent products of low 
social necessity. License fees appear to be a logical form of compensation for 
such patent rights, while valuable knowhow is difficult to define and its 
remuneration is harder to explain in a regulatory framework. 68 
This area calls for an administrative structure with a large degree of discre-
tion in the approval (preferably not ex post facto) of the allowable compensation 
for imported technology, and the period during which such technology must 
be paid for. Regrettably, such administrative discretion is the essence of the 
local uncertainty which discourages even serious inyestors and encourages 
local corruption and graft in some countries. 
It is suggested that a solution to some of these uncertainties might be for the 
host nation to insist that the host nation enterprise benefit from the most 
favorable terms extended to any related or third party by the licensor. Such a 
'most favored licensee' clause could take account of the declining value over 
time of technology subject to license. 
D. Foreign Banks and Financial Transactions - Exchange Controls 
Regulation relating principally to activities after the initial foreign invest-
ment is made is exemplified by the exchange controls of many countries which 
prohibit residents or nationals from maintaining bank accounts abroad. In 
detail, such regulations may be described as having one or more of the 
elements set out in Table 6. 69 
In view of this matrix consider the problem at a(1)-b(3)-c(1)-d(2) for the 
foreign investor who wishes to give a local national signatory powers on one of 
the group bank accounts managed from his country but located abroad. Fre-
quently such permission, part of the normal increase of the professional 
responsibilities of the local employee, is excluded by a law too broadly worded. 
Consider the case of' France at a(5)-b(4)-c(1)-d(3) where it is forbidden to 
send any 'check' abroad. An American visiting France who mails his check on 
a U.S. bank to his U.S. landlord could find his check confiscated by French 
customs and a penalty imposed equal to five times the face value of the 
check. 70 Fortunately, this rule is rarely enforced except as to French nationals 
at present. Nevertheless, the U.S. embassy had to obtain a special authoriza-
68. For a discussion of fees for technology as an apparent means of transferring profits, 
without regard to the real value of the technology, SII LALL& STREETEN, supra note 12, at 145-50. 
69. Table 6 is Annex 3, Table D. No complete review of exchange controls is attempted in 
view of the information available in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 29TH ANNUAL REPORT 
ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS (1978). 
70. Arrete of9 August 1973, art. V, (1973JJ.O. __ (Fr.). 
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TABLE 6 
Foreign Banking and Financial Transactions - Exchange Controls 
a (ii) b country "x" , (ii) d t 
1. No national of 1. may have 1. foreign 1. bank accounts 1. in any case 
2. No permanent 2. may have any 2. foreign cur- 2. security 2. without ap-
resident of (i) interest in rency amounts proval of the 
central bank or 
Finance Min-
istry 
3. No person or- 3. may have 3. local non- 3. overdraft ac- 3. except through 
dinarily resi- signature on resident counts or bor- an authorized 
dent in (i) rowing intermediary 
(national 
bank) 
4. No resident 4. may make any 4. currency 4. except with re-
of (i) transfer of hedging con- spect to re-
funds to or in tracts transfer of au-
or among thorized for-
eign invest-
ments within a 
specified per-
iod (and earn-
ings thereon) 
5. No person on 5. may make 5. securities and 5. at the favored 
the territory transfers or means of pay- commercial 
of loans of funds ment exchange rate 
between do- without au-
mestic bank thorization 
accounts 
6. No domicili- 6. may import 6. insurance 6. (Specific ex-
ary of or export in- contract emptions for 
struments for commercial 
transactions 
are not cov-
ered in the 
examples.) 
(i) The word "resident" being variously defined, but including companies organized or regis-
tered in a state. 
(ii) The counterpart of this regulation, relating to the right of non-residents to have internal ac-
counts, is not here treated. As to controls by the base country on investments and transfers by 
its nationals and residents, stt OECD, INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (3d rev. ed. 
OECD 1975). 
tion to establish in Paris the U.S. payroll and Social Security payment center 
for Europe in order to use the French mail to send checks abroad. A regulation 
designed to permit French customs to control illegal transfers abroad by 
French exchange residents is worded so ineptly that it has substantially 
discouraged corporations from establishing headquarters for trading and 
financial operations in France. 
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Similarly, errors in the design of other regulatory schemes to effect specific 
goals may interfere with business activities outside the scope of intended 
regulation. France can be cited as a developed nation whose regulations have 
been written by administrators having little practical business experience and 
little practical experience with the needs of multinational (non-French base 
country) businesses. 
Regulations such as the French regulations71 and the Bank of England Ex-
change Controls of 194772 illustrate the broad drafting of legislation. How-
ever, these regulations are rarely enforced due to administrative discretion. 
The uncertainty of such temporarily and informally suspended regulations 
may cause a foreign investor not to take the risk of a sudden and unforeseeable 
change of operating rules for his business. This is especially true where the 
tolerance accorded may be revoked by administrative fiat without legislative 
action or notice. 
With the best intentions, the persons responsible for such regulations have 
discouraged financial and trading operations which would have only a positive 
effect on the national economy in terms of employment, investment and ex-
pertise generation, and would not eliminate jobs of nationals or divert national 
funds. The problem appears in several cases to be an absence of analysis of the 
economic effect of those rules on the matrix73 which need not apply in certain 
cases, such as foreign companies or export oriented companies (subsidiaries) 
of national groups. A liberal policy of exemptions and binding ruling letters on 
key issues could soften the risk posed by abrupt changes in general regula-
tions, or in their application. When an investor wishes to create such an opera-
tion it is suggested that a specific ruling be requested upon the specific set of 
facts involved and showing the economic benefit to the host country. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Where, then, should financial regulations exist? This important question 
has not been regarded in sufficient detail in the form of decision matrices to 
enable political and economic desires to be transformed into a regulatory 
frameworks. Each set of conditions may require a different approach; how-
71. DATAR, AIDES AU DEVELOPMENT REGIONAL (1976); DATAR, INVESTMENT AND Ex· 
PORT FINANCING (1975); Commentaire Administratif du 18 Mai 1973, BULLETIN OFFICIEL DE LA 
DIRECTION GENERAL DES IMi'6Ts 5 (4-C-2-73); Law No. 72-1147, art. 6, Law of December 23, 
1972, [1972) RECUEIL DES LOIS II 152, 155, [1973) B. L. D. __ ; see Law No. 74-1114, art. 3, 
Law of December 27, 1974, [1974) RECUEIL DES LOIS II 88,92, [1975) B. L. D. 13, 14; Le Con-
trole des Changes, BANQUE FRANCAISE DU COMMERCE EXTERIEUR (1977); France, Bus. WEEK, 
Sept. 12, 1977, at 108. 
72. The E;xchange Control Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14. Britain has recently abolished its 
currency controls. See What Abolishing Controls Means for Foreign Investors, Foreign Marlcets, WORLD 
Bus. WEEKLY, Oct. 29, 1979, at 5; After Exchange Controls, A Moment of Vertigo, WORLD Bus. 
WEEKLY, Nov. 12, 1979, at 63. 
73. See Annex 3, Table D. 
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ever, each regulatory approach should incorporate national goals and attitudes 
regarding the desirable scope of regulation. 
This author contends that the field of economic regulation of foreign invest-
ment is substantially underdeveloped. More detailed work will identify areas 
which may not be submitted to general regulation with desirable effect and 
areas where only extreme cases of abuse should be regulated. These must be 
distinguished from areas which have such clearly definable interest, par-
ticularly with respect to controls of currency movements, that general regula-
tions can be justified even if the application in the particular case may seem in-
appropriate. Such regulation ideally should be conceived by administrators 
who are in contact not only with affected parties (existing investments and 
local suppliers, customers and competitors), but also with potentially affected 
parties and nations, particularly on fiscal questions. Such potentially affected 
parties are hard to locate and identify, normally would not wish to intervene in 
a legislative or administrative process, and generally would have no standing 
before an administrative body or court. 
It is therefore suggested that a study of the economic effects and interrela-
tionships of financial controls on foreign investment should be undertaken by 
the World Bank and the DEeD Staff. Such a study would provide a base for 
greater understanding and efficient resolution of problems both in formulation 
of policy by government units and in government relations with investors. 
The concern of many enterprises regarding financial and other regulation of 
foreign investment appears to be the fear of the unknown as much as the fear 
of the known. Some of the mystery may disappear when present and proposed 
regulations are analyzed by the regulating authorities and by investors to 
determine the economic goals that are being sought and to what extent they 
are being served. 
It is hoped that the matrix analysis system proposed in this article will aid 
both investors7• and. host countries to investment in accomplishing such 
negotiations in their mutual best interests. 
74. For a brief discussion of investor attitudes, S" note 5 supra. 
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APPENDIX 
Annex 1 
Examples of Differing Attitudes Towards Economic Considerations for Foreign Investment 
Host Country 
Economic 
Considerations 
low labor cost 
high tariffs 
use of natural 
resources 
labor intensive 
investment 
participation 
in trade zone 
Base Country 
Attitude 
Investor 
Attitude 
Host Country 
Attitude 
- threat to base - positive - desire to increase 
living standard country employ-
ment 
- poor export 
market 
- neutral, unless 
competitor 
(negative) or 
user (positive) 
- threat to local 
employment 
- neutral or 
positive 
- negative for 
import of 
means of pro-
duction or 
product. Pro-
tected market 
once estab-
lished 
- positive 
- desire to pro-
tect inefficient 
local production 
- fear of exploi-
tation of low-cost 
internal labor 
- desire to develop 
- desire to encour-
age further trans-
formation . 
- pOSItive - - positive 
subject to labor 
law 
- positive unless - positive need 
entrenched for sheltered 
competition export markets 
Others 
- usually host 
country also 
seeks to export 
transformed 
products 
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Annex 2 
Financial Regulations of Foreign Investment 
1) Regulation oj /n",stmmJ (Sector, location and capital) 
A. Protected sectors and limits on foreign ownership 
B. Preliminary permissions and investment incentives 
C. The right to expand (linear, diversifying, integrating growth) 
D. Minimum capital structure and equilibrium 
E. Repatriation controls and guarantees 
2) Regulation oj Firraru:ing OperationP 
A. Use of external loans and guarantees 
B. Borrowing on local and foreign markets 
C. Intercompany loans and interest 
D. Split exchange rates and investment discounts and premiums 
3) Regulation oj CurTmq Transactions 
A. Sending checks, instruments of payment and securities abroad 
B. Making transfers abroad 
C. The right to have foreign bank accounts 
D. Availability of foreign exchange; set off and paired import and export transactions 
E. Covering forward transactions and capital erosion 
F. Putting up tender bonds domestically or abroad 
G. Insuring risks and benefits abroad 
4) Regulation oj Operations and Trade 
A. Importation of patents, trademarks, knowhow and payment of royalties 
B. Payment of commissions to foreign agents (affiliates or others) 
C. Management and service fees 
D. Parent company guarantees to third parties to aid operations 
E. Intercompany supply and marketing contracts 
F. Deposits and taxes on payments abroad or imports 
G. Customs and regulations of imports of goods and equipment 
5) Regulation oj Profits and Distributions 
A. Reserves and dividends - Limited rate of return 
B. Withholding taxes on dividends, interest and royalties paid abroad 
C. Loans abroad to related parties 
D. Treaty implications and tax sparing 
6) Regulation of Person,.,/ 
A. Payment of hard currency salaries and insured or other benefits 
B. Living allowances and advantages 
C. Repatriation of funds of foreign personnel (during and at end of stay) 
D. Currency allowances for foreign business travel; time exigencies 
E. Exemption of foreign nationals from local rules prohibiting foreign financial accounts and 
investments 
F. Role of foreign managers and technicians 
7) Taxes 
A. Income 
B. Turnover 
C. Social taxes and transferability of benefits 
D. Capital 
E. Excise and transfer of assets 
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Annex 3 
Table A: Financing Investment and Operations - Capital Controls 
a b d 
(i) shall be supplied by from sources to the extent of 
1. The initial invest- 1. Authorized In- 1. Outside the host 1. 100% 
ment vestment capital country 
(iii) 
2. Total long term 2. Long term private 2. Within the host 2. At least x% (ii) 
capital needs financing country 
3. Total capital and 3. Long term bank 3. In the base coun- 3. Not over 7 % (ii) 
operating needs financing try 
4. Financing ac- 4. Short term loans 4. In host country 4. 0% 
corded to sup- from (non bank) (internal) cur-
pliers sources rency 
5. Financing ac- 5. Short term bank 5. In non-host coun- O. No provision 
corded to financing try (external) (Any, some or all) 
customers currency 
6. Financing for any 6. Loans and facil- O. Anywhere (no 
purpose from or ities granted regulations) 
to related persons against guar-
antees provided 
by a first class 
host country 
bank 
7. Import financing 7. Loans and facil-
ities granted 
against guar-
antees pro-
vided by a first 
class foreign bank 
or other institu-
tion (strawmen) 
8. Export financing 8. Loans of related 
parties 
9. Guarantees of re-
lated parties 
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Annex 3 - Continued 
Table A: Financing Inves.tment and Operations - Capital Controls 
a b d 
(i) shall be supplied by from sources to the extent of 
10. Swap trans-
actions with for-
eign deposits 
11. (For export 
credit incen-
tives see An-
nex 3, Table B) 
12. (For tax incen-
tives see Annex 
3, Table B(c» 
13. (For reinvested 
earnings see An-
nex, 3 Table 
B(c» 
O. Any means 
General Noles 
(i) Choices on the matrix are expressed as the sum ofthe elements selected across the matrix. 
Thus in A: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 expresses the initial investment shall be supplied by Authorized 
Investment capital from sources outside the host country to the extent of 100% or 
regulatory language to that effect. 
(ii) x and y singly or together may equal under 100%. 
Noles 10 Example A 
(iii) The nature of investment approvals, limits, or guarantees on repatriation of capital and 
profits, and protection guarantees against capital erosion constitute other matrices not 
presented here. See Boddewyn, supra note 12, at 19. The grounds for such approval are 
generally those governing the availability of incentives. See Example B column d, and Ex-
ample D column e item 4. As to base country regulations and incentives SII OECD, IN-
VESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (3d rev. ed. OECD 1975). 
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a 
With respect to a 
1. new 
2. additional 
3. new, addition-
al or existing 
(modernizing 
or transform-
ing) 
Table B: Investment Incentives 
b 
Enterprise or 
investment by 
1. anyone 
2. foreign in-
vestors 
3. local investors 
under foreign 
ultimate con-
trol 
4. local investors 
5. local investors 
not having 
their principal 
place of busi-
ness in a des-
ignated terri-
tory 
c 
The incentive(s) of 
Taxes (ii) (see 10 below) 
1. Exemption or reduction of income tax (federal and 
local): special exemption of export earnings for x 
years (exemption of incentive payments) 
2. Exemption from property taxes and local tax 
3. Exemption from excise taxes, business licenses, 
stamp, transfer, capital contributions taxes 
4. Exemption from turnover or use and sales taxes 
5. Exemption from x years of social charges on 
( alII I 0 c a I / tee h n i c a II man u a II 0 I d I 
young) workers 
6. Exemption from inventory tax 
7. Exemption from customs duties and import restric-
tions or depletion allowances of over 100% 
8. Accelerated amortization of capital equipment, or 
depletion allowances of over 100% 
9. Tax credits for purchases and construction of assets 
Investment (ii) (see 25 below) 
10. Cash grants or financing of construction and equip-
ment of a plant at x% of below normal mortgage 
rates and aid in acquiring plant 
11. Aid for investment studies and business promotion 
12. National investment company (temporary) invest-
ment capital 
13. Free infrastructure and utility connections and 
guaranteed reduced freight and utility rates 
Financing (see 10 above and 24 below) 
14. Guarantees for constructing and equipping plant at 
prime lender loan rate, or on lease purchase 
15. Interest rate rebates, interest free loans or financing 
advantages and interest subsidies 
16. Guarantees for loans for working capital ofx% of an-
nual payroll created, y % of needs or z % of turnover 
Personnel (see 5 above) 
17. State aid in recruiting personnel and hiring grants, 
and worker relocation allowances and housing 
18. Training at a cost of up to x units of money for every 
. job created plus bonuses for technical training 
19. Facilitation in obtaining work permits for foreign na-
tionals for up to x % of ihe work force of the plant 
20. Temporary tax exemptions of foreign managers 
Commerce (see 1, 7, 15 above) 
21. Aid in acquiring patent and trademark rights 
22. Assistance in bidding in state contracts 
23. Export incentives and credit guarantees 
24. Exchange control advantage 
Research 
25. Grants, interest free loans and incentives for research 
and development 
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Table B Cont'd. 
d 
For such investments which in the designated areas (i) 
1. Creates or upgrades at least in jobs (over a 
minimum) 
a: for every x jobs, 
b: for every y units of wages paid, 
c: for every z units of investment 
2. Guarantees to put over x units of money or 
y % of sales and/or profits into annual re-
search 
3. Hires handicapped, aged, young, unskilled or 
technically unemployable persons: for every y 
employees and z units of wages 
4. Represents a new industry and manufacture 
of new products 
5. Aids depressed/favored industries or areas 
6. Conserves or develops natural resources and 
provides a sound infrastructure 
7. Promotes exports 
8. Causes the import of significant capital 
9. Improves work conditions 
10. Improves productivity 
11. Creates or preserves viable stable industries 
12. Reduces imports 
e 
1. Shall be made 
2. May be made 
by 
3. Shall be with-
in the author-
ity to make of 
61 
f 
(Host Country's) 
1. Federal gov-
ernment 
2. Local govern-
ment 
3. Industrial De-
velopment au-
thority 
4. International 
or Regional 
Body 
(i) These regulations frequently include provisions limiting the application of all or part of the 
advantages to part of the territory administered. 
(ii) See TAX TREATIES, supra note 59, at 98, on the economic need for incentives to reinvest earn-
ings, and for a general summary of incentives. 
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Table C: Importation and Remuneration of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights (i), (ii) 
a 
1. All patents sold 
2. All patents 
licensed 
3. All trademarks & 
copyrights granted 
4. All knowhow 
transferred 
5. All knowhow not 
available locally 
transferred 
6. All intellectual 
property rights 
sold or licensed 
b 
To a host country en-
terprise by 
1. A foreign entity 
2. An entity under 
foreign control . 
3. Any transferor re-
lated to the trans-
feree 
4. Any transferor 
c 
Shall be transferred 
for a price which 
shall not exceed 
x% of 
I. The value of the 
goods produced 
thereby 
2. The total turnover 
of the enterprise 
3. The value as de-
preciated of the 
capital equipment 
operating with re-
spect thereto 
4. The total related 
salaries of the en-
terprise 
5. The lowest rate or 
price charged to 
any unrelated user 
6. Their reasonable 
value (minimum 
amount) 
d 
Increased/de-
creased propor-
tionally to the 
percentage of 
1. Foreign sales as a 
percentage of 
turnover 
2. Increase of turn-
over attributable 
thereto 
3. Increase of em-
ployment attribu-
table thereto 
4. (The percentage of 
ownership or con-
trol of the trans-
feree held directly 
or indirectly by 
the transferor) 
5. Research invest-
ment made in the 
country 
6. (Components pur-
chased from, or 
taxes paid for and 
fees paid to the li-
censor) 
7. (Product which 
must be sold back 
to the licensor) 
O. No provision 
(i) The provisions for authorization of such remuneration would present a separate matrix. 
(ii) See TAX TREATIES, supra note 59, at 45, on gross or net taxation and withholding rates as an 
additional means of limiting the return to the licensor. 
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Table 0: Foreign Banking and Financial Transactions - Exchange Controls 
a (ii) b country "x" 
1. No national of 1. may have 
2. No permanent 2. may have any 
resident of (i) interest in 
3. No person or- 3. may have 
dinarily resi- signature on 
dent in (i) 
4. No resident 4. may make any 
of (i) transfer of 
funds to or in 
or among 
5. No person on 5. may make 
the territory transfers or 
of loans of funds 
between do-
mestic bank 
accounts 
6. No domicili- 6. may import 
ary of or export in-
stroments for 
, (ii) d 
1. foreign 1. bank accou n ts 
2. foreign cur- 2. security 
rency amounts 
3. local non- 3. overdraft ac-
resident counts or bor-
rowing 
4. currency 
hedging con-
tracts 
5. securities and 
means of pay-
ment 
6. insurance 
contract 
1. in any case 
2. without ap-
proval of the 
central bank or 
Finance Min-
istry 
3. except through 
an authorized 
intermediary 
(national 
bank) 
4. except with re-
spect to re-
transfer of au-
thorized for-
eign invest-
ments within a 
specified per-
iod (and earn-
ings thereon) 
5. at the favored 
commercial 
exchange rate 
without au-
thorization 
6. (Specific ex-
emptions for 
commercial 
transactions 
are not cov-
ered in the 
examples.) 
(i) The word "resident" being variously defined, but including companies organized or regis-
tered in a state. 
(ii) The counterpart of this regulation, relating to the right of non-residents to have internal ac-
counts, is not here treated. As to controls by the base country on investments and transfers by 
its nationals and residents, set OECD, INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (3d rev. ed. 
OECD 1975). 
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Bibliographical References for Notes to Matrices 
General 
A. Vagts, The Host Country Fo.ces the MultiMtioMI EnttT/Jrise, 53 B. U. L. REV. 261 (1973) (Ref. 
A General). 
B. TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U. N. Doc. ST/ECAI 
188 (3d Report 1973) (includes Sri Lanka) (Ref. B). 
C. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT: A REEXAMINATION, U. N. 
Doc. ElC10.38 (1978) (Ref. Bc). 
D. INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, (3d rev. ed. O.E.C.D. 1975) (Ref. Bc). 
E. DoING BUSINESS IN EUROPE (Ref. Bc (see for each country), d, e). 
F. INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD (ICSID ed. 1979). 
G. WORLD BANK EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS, 27TH ANNUAL REPORT (1977) (Ref. A, D). 
United States of America (USA) 
A. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (R. 
Rosendahl ed. 1972) (Ref. Bc, d, I). 
B. STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 2 (October 5, 1977) (summarizing Report of House Sub-
committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs to House Ways and Means Committee 
(Ref. Bc, d, I). 
European Economic Community (EEC) 
A. European Regional Development Fund, discussed in BANK BRUSSELS LAMBERT, BELGIUM, 
LAND OF INVESTMENT 48-50 (6th ed. 1975) (Ref. Bc, d, I). 
B. Necessite et Orientation d' Actions Communautaires d'Encouragement des In-
vestissements Europeens dans les Pays en Voie de Developement, EEC Communique (78) 
23 Dinal (1978) (Ref. Ab). 
C. Les Aides a I'Expansion Industrielle Regionale dans les Pays du Marche Commun, La 
Documentation FranlWaise No. 3,917, at 15 (11 Septembre 1972) (Ref. Ba, c, d, e, I). 
D. Boddewyn, Western European Policies Toward US Investors, 93-95 THE BULL. 51 (1974) (Ref. 
Bc). 
E. R. W ALeMAN, & B. MONSBACH, INVESTMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAMS IN WESTERN 
EUROPE (1978) (published by U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (Ref. Bc, d). 
Belgium 
A. The Economic Expansion Act 1959 (17 July 1959), discussed in BANK BRUSSELS LAMBERT, 
BELGIUM, LAND OF INVESTMENT 27-33 (6th ed. 1975). The act applies nationwide. (Ref. 
Ba, b, c, d, e, I). 
B. The Economic Expansion Act 1970 (dated 30 December 1970, effective 1 January 1971), 
discussed in BANK BRUSSELS LAMBERT, BELGIUM, LAND OF INVESTMENT 33-39, 58 (6th ed. 
1975). The act applies only to two categories of development areas established by decree. 
The act also encourages foreign investments in the interests ofthehost nation and Belgium. 
(Ref. Aa, b, c, d;Ba, b, c, d, e, I). 
C. Employment Act 1963, discussed in BANK BRUSSELS LAMBERT, BELGIUM, LAND OF INVEST. 
MENT 40-42 (6th ed. 1975) (Ref. Ba, b, c, d, e, I). 
D. BANK BRUSSELS LAMBERT, BELGIUM, LAND OF INVESTMENT 51-58, 60-63, 68, 69, 77-89 
(6th ed. 1975) (Ref. Aa, b, c, d, investments in Belgium; Aa, b, c, d, export financing; Ba, 
b, (if industrially active) c, d, e, f; Da, b, c, d, e). 
E. Winterbeck, Belgium Welcomes Foreign IndustriolInvestors, 1974 BELGIAN AM. TRADE REV. 17, 
42-44 (Ref. Bc). 
F. The Egrrwnt Plan and Investment Incentives, 1977 REPORT FROM BRUSSELS (Banque Bruxelles 
Lambert ed.) (Ref. Bc generally d). 
G. MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, SERVICE FOR ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND FOREIGN IN· 
VESTMENTS, PROMOTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BELGIUM (Feb. 1978) (Ref. B; De). 
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H. MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, SERVICE FOR ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENTS, THE BELGIUM SYSTEM OF TAXATION OF INCOME (Sept. 1977) (Ref. Bc). 
I. MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, BELGIUM - INVESTMENT GUIDE Oanuary 1977) (Ref. 
Bc) (see discussion under Belgium G). 
France 
A. GUIDE BOOK FOR FOREIGN COMPANIES IN FRANCE, J. STREICHENBERGER, MICHEL 
PICHARD ET CIE AND S.T.R.E.C.O. (197+) (Ref. Ab). 
B. BANQUE FRANCAISE DU COMMERCE EXTERIEUR, LES IMPLANTATIONS FRANCAISES A 
L'ETRANGER (1975). This work is not referred to in the case analyses as it presents ex-
clusively and comprehensively the advantages of investing abroad, particularly to develop 
French export. Foreign investors in France can thus reinvest in a third country. 
C. DATAR, AIDES AU DEVEWPEMENT REGIONAL (1976) (Ref. Bc, d). 
D, DATAR, INVESTMENT AND EXPORT FINANCING (1975) (Ref. Bc, e). 
E. Commmtaire AdminislraJif du 18 mJJi 1973, BULLETIN OFFICIAL DE LA DIRECTION GENERAL 
DES IMPOTs 5 (4-C-2-73); Law No. 72-1147, art. 6 of the Law, December 23, 1972, (1972] 
RECUEIL DES LOIS II 152, 155, [1973] B.L.D. __ . 
F. Regltmmlalwn du Commerce ExlirUur el des Changes, LIBRAIRIE DU JOURNAL DES NOTAIRES ET 
DES AVOCATS (March 1978) (Ref. Aa, b; Dc, e, cited by decree number). 
G. Le Conlrok des Changes, BANQUE FRANCAISE DU COMMERCE EXTERIEUR (1977) (Ref. Dd). 
H. France, Bus. WEEK, September 12, 1977, at 108 (Ref. Dd, e). 
Italy 
A. F. G. Guinto, Investimenti de Capitali Esteri (Rome, 1977) (unpublished) (Ref. Ab; Bc, d; 
Ca; De) 
Great Britain (United Kingdom) 
A. P. BARCLAY, THE CONTROL OF INWARD INVESTMENT INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM (1977) 
(The Barclay's Group of Banks) (Ref. Aa, b, c, d; Ba, c, d). 
B. The Exchange Control Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14 (Ref. Aa, b, c, d). 
C. A. PARKER, ExCHANGE CONTROL (2d ed. 1976) (Ref. A, B, D). 
Ireland 
A. BANK OF IRELAND, DUBLIN, A GENERAL GUIDE TO INVESTMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
IRELAND, (197+). 
B. TOUCHE Ross & Co., BUSINESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (March 1973) (Distributed 
by Rowe & Pitman, London) (Ref. Bc, d). 
Greece 
A. Decree laws and laws 
1. 2687/1953 (Ref. Bc; De). 
2. 89/1967 (Ref. Bc). 
3. 289/1976 (Ref. Bc, d). 
4. 4458/1965 (Industrial Areas Ref. Bc). 
5. 1378/1973 and 1313/1972 (Ref. Bc). 
6. 417111961 (updated 1977) (Ref. Ba, c, d, e; Cc; De). 
7. 1377/1973 and 1078/1971 and 1312/1977 (Ref. Bc, d). 
See Greece in 3 INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD (ICSID ed. 1977). 
B. BANQUE HELLENIQUE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL, S.A., INVESTISSEMENTS EN 
GRECE: No.2, TAUX D'AMORTISSEMENT (1977) (Ref. Bc); BANQUE HELLENIQUE POUR LE 
DEVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL, S.A., INVESTISSEMENTS EN GRECE: No.4, INCITATIONS AU 
DEVELOPPEMENT REGIONALE (1977) (Ref. Bc, d); BANQUE HELLENIQUE POUR LE 
DEVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL, S.A., INVESTISSEMENTS EN GRECE: No.6, INCITATIONS A 
L'ExPORTATION (1977) (Ref. Bc, d; De). 
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C. Ministere de Finance, Direction de L'Information et des Relations Internationales: ImpO! 
sur Revenu des Personnes Morales (August 1977) (unpublished bulletin) (Ref. Bc, d); 
Ministere de Finance, Direction de l'Information et des Relations Internationales: Incen-
tives to Regional Development, No.4 (August 1977) (unpublished bulletin) (Ref. Bc, d); 
Ministere de Finance, Direction de l'Information et des Relations Internationales: 
Finan.;;ement Bancaire, No.5 (August 1977) (unpublished bulletin) (Ref. Bc, d). 
Cyprus 
A. Letter from Dr. Achilles C. Emilianides, Esq. of Nicosia Qan. 5, 1978) (Ref. Aa, b, c, d; 
Ca, b, c; Da, b, c, d). 
B. MINISTRY OF FINANCE, NICOSIA, TAX INCENTIVES IN CYPRUS (1977) (referring to the In-
come Tax Laws No. 37 of 1975 and No. 15 of 1977) (Ref. Ba, b, c, d, e, I). 
C. Chrysostimides, The Legal Aspects oj Foreign Irwestmmts in Cyrpus, ANNUAIRE DE L'AAA DE 
L'AcADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE DE LA HAYE (to be published in 1980). 
Latin America 
A. Kantor, Restrictions in Latin America, 1977 LES NOUVELLES 227 (Sept. 1977) (Ref. Cc). 
B. Nattier, Limitations on Marketing Foreign Technology in Brazil, 11 INT'L LAw. 437 (1976) (Ref. 
Cc, d). 
C. Brazil: Tax Incentivefor Agriculture, INT'L TAX REP. 4 (26 September 1977) (Ref. Bc). 
Far East 
A. Li, Taiwan (Republic oj China), CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DoING BUSINESS IN THE FAR 
EAST 171 (R. Allison ed. 1972) (Ref. Aa, d; Bc); Kim, South Korea (Republic oj Korea), CUR· 
RENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DoING BUSINESS IN THE FAR EAST 194 (R. Allisoned. 1972)(Ref. 
Bd; Dd, e). 
B. Yoon, Legal Aspects oj Foreign Investment in the Republic oj Korea, 10 INT'L LAw. 729 (1975). 
C. M. LIN & K. KiLiMNIK, LEGAL AsPECTS OF DoiNG BUSINESS IN TAIWAN (1977) (Ref. Aa; 
Ba, c, d; De). 
D. Chandler, IntrodlUtion to Business Law in Thailand, 2 NEWSLETTER 7 (1978) (Section ofInter-
national Law, American Bar Association) (Ref. Bc). 
Tunisia 
A. H. ABED & A. ABED, MOTIVATIONS POUR UN DROIT INTERNATIONALE DES IN· 
VESTISSEMENTS ET EXPERIENCE TUNISIENNE (1977) (Athens Conference Proceedings, An-
nuaire de I' AAA, Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague 1977). 
B. Law 69-35, Code des Investissements (favoring capital importation); Law 74-74 of 3 
August 1974, Incentives for Employment Creation; Law 72-38 of 27 April 1972 (favoring 
export industries) (Ref. Aa, b, c, d; Ba, b, c, d, e, f; Da, b, c, d, e). 
